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INTRODUCTION
The decade proceeding the 9/11 tragedy has been very unkind to the human rights regime, as many western nations
have committed human rights abuses in their mission to combat terrorism. Both the United States and the United Kingdom
have been engaged in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, where
they perpetrated terrible crimes and violated important tenants of international law. These violations, ranging from allegations of torture to wrongful deaths, are prohibited by human
rights law. In fact, human rights treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) were enacted
with the express purpose of eliminating the very atrocities that
have been committed in the “war on terror.” Unfortunately, the
United States and the United Kingdom have maintained that
human rights treaties do not apply beyond their territorial borders. The issue of the extraterritorial nature of the treaties is
therefore crucially important because the crimes that have
been committed by these two nations can only be remedied if
the treaties can be interpreted to apply to the territory in question.1
On July 7, 2011, the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR) issued a landmark decision in Al-Skeini et al. v. The
United Kingdom, overturning the United Kingdom’s House of
Lords decision and issuing a strong precedent stating that human rights treaties should apply extraterritorially.2 Al- Skeini
held that the ECHR applied to six Iraqi civilians who were
killed while under the authority and control of the British military during their occupation in 2003.3 This case is the most recent of court opinions that have affirmed the notion that the
object and purpose of a human rights instrument should be
taken into heavy consideration when determining the extraterritorial nature of a treaty.
In determining whether human rights treaties apply extraterritorially, it is necessary to analyze important provisions
and terms in a particular agreement. However, as illustrated in
Damira Kamchibekova, State Responsibility for Extraterritorial Human
Rights Violations, 13 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 87, 87 (2007).
2 Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R. 589
(2011).
3 Id.
1
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The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (the Vienna
Convention), the analysis of a human rights instrument often
hinges on semantics. Traditionally, the meaning of a provision
was based on the definiteness of the language and the plain
meaning of the terms.4 Recently, however, courts such as the
ECtHR have been reluctant to settle with the “ordinary meaning analysis” of treaty interpretation (as suggested in Article 31
of the Vienna Convention) when there are “manifestly absurd”
results from adherence to such an approach.5 Instead, many international courts have embraced the exceptions present in Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, allowing them to bring in
subsequent state practice, context, purpose, and travaux pre6
paratoires.
Consequently, a complete understanding of the definitions
of each word or phrase is essential to a proper analysis. As Joanne Williams points out in her article, Al-Skeini: A Flawed Interpretation of Bankovic, jurisdiction and territory are not interchangeable.7 "Jurisdiction refers to a particular sphere of
legal competence, while "territory" refers to a geographical area."8 While all actions occurring within the state's sovereign
territory are within its jurisdiction, it does not follow that actions occurring extraterritorially are therefore outside of the
state's jurisdiction.
Most treaties are specific and clear to which geographical
9
areas they apply. They contain provisions of territorial jurisdiction, limiting the treaties’ applicability to actions occurring
4 Blaine Sloan describes two competing views of treaty interpretation
present during the drafting of the Vienna Convention. The United States’
theory, led by MacDougal, is largely contextual, with equal weight being given to the plain meaning, alongside the travaux and subsequent state practice.
MacDougal’s theory of treaty interpretation ultimately lost out to the British
method, which favored the plain meaning analysis. Under the British method, supplemental aspects were only brought into the analysis when adhering
to the plain meaning left the meaning “ambiguous” or when the result would
be “absurd.” Blaine Sloan, The United Nations Charter as a Constitution, 1
PACE Y.B. INT’L. L. 61, 95 (1989).
5 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 32, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
6 Id.
7 Joanne Williams, Al Skeini: A Flawed Interpretation of Bankovic, 23
WIS. INT’L L.J. 687, 691 (2005).
8 Id.
9 See Antoine Buyse, Legal Minefield - The Territorial Scope of the European Convention, 1 INTER-AM. & EUR. HUM. RTS. J. 269 (2008).
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within the boundaries of the state. The European Convention,
however, does not contain any such provision, and is unclear as
to its territorial scope. Moreover, while the ICCPR does have a
territorial provision, it has not been applied in that fashion.
This Note discusses the extraterritorial application of both
treaties, and specifically seeks to determine whether their provisions apply to actions of state actors outside of their territories.
Part I of this Note outlines the applicable international law
and examines the history of the ECHR and the issue of its extraterritorial application. This section will trace the history of
this contentious issue through the past few decades, concentrating in particular on the ECtHR’s decision in Bankovic et al.
v. Belgium et al. Part II will discuss the ECtHR’s decision in
Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, and the Court’s rationale for its
holding. Although the decision in Al-Skeini did not overturn
Bankovic, it modified the precedent going forward, and stands
as a monumental decision for extraterritorial application of
human rights treaties.
Part III weighs the impact of the Al-Skeini decision against
the continued failure of the United States to apply their human
rights instruments extraterritorially. Focusing on the application of the ICCPR to human rights abuses across the world,
this Note will outline the United States’ troubling perspective.
It will close with the suggestion that the United States might
be slowly accepting this growing international custom.
I.

THE LAW AND HISTORY

The European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) was opened for
signature in Rome on November 4, 1950, and entered into force
on September 3, 1953.10 In direct response to the atrocities
committed during the Second World War, the nations of Europe
enacted a human rights treaty to ensure that horrors, like
those committed by the Axis powers, would never again occur.11
10 PIETER DIJK ET AL., THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 2 (3rd ed. 1998).
11 Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol. 1, Motion Adopted by all Defense
Counsel, The Avalon Project (Nov. 19, 1945), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/
imt/v1-30.asp#1. One of the big problems with prosecuting war criminals after the Second World War was that applying the Geneva Conventions retro-
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The preamble of the Convention aimed to secure “the universal
and effective recognition and observation of human rights,” and
ensure “fundamental freedoms which are the foundation of justice and peace in the world.”12
For all the good intentions of the Convention, all treaties
have limits on their applicability, and The European Convention was no exception. Within its first Article, it contains a jurisdictional restraint, stating: “The High Contracting Parties
shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and
freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention.”13 This article
exists as a gateway to the human rights protections of the treaty. Without satisfying the requirement that a person is “within
the jurisdiction” of a High Contracting party-member, the
Court cannot evaluate the substantive claims of the alleged victim.
Whether the ECHR may be applied extraterritorially is not
a trivial issue, for the Court’s determination of this question
serves to define the overall purpose of the treaty. The Court
faces a tough determination: Is the justification for the Convention “located in the intrinsic nature or inherent dignity of all
human beings,” or in “the relationship between the Contracting
States and this subset of persons [?]”14 Or, put more simply:
Does this human rights treaty, and set of obligations it carries,
apply to all persons, or to merely a specific subset of persons?
While the issue might seem to revolve around an insignificant
disagreement, the implication of valuing a jurisdictional relationship over promoting human rights worldwide is immense.

actively went against all precepts of just law. During the Nuremberg trials,
the Nazi defendants claimed that “[t]he present Trial can, therefore, as far as
Crimes against Peace shall be avenged, not invoke existing international law,
it is rather a proceeding pursuant to a new penal law, a penal law enacted
only after the crime. This is repugnant to a principle of jurisprudence sacred
to the civilized world.” Enacting human rights treaties such as the ECHR ensured this would no longer be an issue.
12 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, preamble, Apr. 11, 1950, C.E.T.S. No. 194, available at
http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm [hereinafter
ECHR].
13 Id. art. 1. (emphasis added).
14 Erik Roxtrom, et. al., The NATO Bombing Case (Bankovic et al. v. Belgium et al.) and the Limits of Western Human Rights Protection, 23 B. U.
INT’L L.J. 55, 76 (2005) [hereinafter NATO Bombing Case].
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Early Cases

The Court had dealt with the issue of the extraterritorial
application of the ECHR in several cases before Al- Skeini et al.
v. United Kingdom and Bankovic et al. v. Belgium et al.. In
1975, the Court decided Cyprus v. Turkey.15 In that case, Turkey argued that a communication from Cyprus was inadmissible because it related to alleged violations outside of Turkey’s
(a Contracting state) territory.16 The Court disagreed with
Turkey, holding:
Taking into account the terms used and the purpose of the Convention as a whole, state responsibility might be incurred by acts
of the state that produce effects outside the national territory.
The reason for this is that such agents remain under the state’s
jurisdiction when abroad and they bring persons and property
within this particular “jurisdiction” to the extent that they exer17
cise authority over them.

The Court clearly accepted the idea that actions by state
actors outside of their territories could potentially amount to
“jurisdiction.”18
The Court reiterated the extraterritorial aspect of the Convention’s application in the 1995 case Loizidou v. Turkey.19
Loizidou, a Cypriot national, filed an application against Turkey for expelling her from her island home during Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus in 1974.20 After the invasion, many Cypriots
attempted to return to their homes, but were denied access by
21
the Turkish military.
The ECtHR, concentrating solely on the question of whether the applicant’s complaint could fall within the “jurisdiction”
of Turkey, again reaffirmed the principle that Article 1 was not
limited to the territory of the Convention’s Contracting Par22
ties. Considering the object and purpose of the Convention, as
15 Cyprus v. Turkey, App. Nos. 6780/74, 6950/75, 4 Eur. Comm’n H.R.
Dec. & Rep. 125 (1975) [hereinafter Cyprus v. Turkey]
16 Id. at 485.
17 Id. (emphasis added).
18 Id.
19 Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser A.) ¶ 61 (1995) (preliminary
objections) [hereinafter Loizidou v. Turkey, Preliminary Objections].
20 Id. ¶¶ 10-14.
21 Id.
22 NATO Bombing Case, supra note 14, at 78.
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required by the second clause in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, the Court noted: “the responsibility of a Contracting
Party may also arise when, as a consequence of military action
. . . it exercises effective control of an area outside its national
territory.”23 Ultimately, the Court found that when a Contracting Party exercised effective control of an area, or people within
the area, the Convention’s Article 1 jurisdictional requirement
was met.24
B. Bankovic et al. v. Belgium et al.
In 2001, the ECtHR established new precedent in
Bankovic et al. v. Belgium et al.25 This case dealt with the issue
of the extraterritorial application of the ECHR involving human rights violations committed solely through military airstrikes. The applicants in Bankovic, all citizens of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (“FRY”), petitioned the ECtHR to hold
the nations of NATO accountable for the many deaths that resulted from the bombing campaign in Serbia. 26
In 1998, armed conflict erupted between members of the
Kosovo Liberation Army, forces of the FRY, the Serbian police,
and paramilitary groups.27 After the breakdown of diplomatic
negotiations, human rights violations continued to ensue. On
March 24, 1999, NATO announced the beginning of air strikes
on the FRY.28 On April 23, 1999, sixteen people were killed,
and sixteen more wounded, when a building housing three television channels and four radio stations was hit by a missile
29
launched from a NATO aircraft. Alleging breaches in Articles
2, 10, and 13 of the ECHR, the appellants sought to invoke the
30
European Convention against the NATO forces.
The Court in Bankovic began its analysis, stating that the
proper way to evaluate Article 1 is enshrined in Articles 31 and
Loizidou v. Turkey, Preliminary Objections, ¶ 62. (emphasis added).
Id. ¶ 64.
25 Bankovic et al. v. Belgium et al., 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333 [hereinafter Bankovic v. Belgium].
26 Id. ¶ 1.
27 Williams, supra note 7, at 689 (describing the escalation of violence in
FRY that led to the NATO attacks.).
28
Id. at 690.
29 Bankovic v. Belgium, ¶10.
30 Williams, supra note 7, at 690.
23
24
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32 of the Vienna Convention.31 Thus, the Court primarily focused on the ordinary meaning of the phrase “within their jurisdiction” in its context, and in the light of the object and purpose of the convention. 32 It held that as to the ordinary
meaning of the term in Article 1, “the jurisdictional competence
of a State is primarily territorial.”33 While acknowledging that
international law does not explicitly “exclude” the application
of jurisdiction extraterritorially, the ECtHR noted: “the suggested bases of such jurisdiction are, as a general rule, defined
and limited by the sovereign territorial rights of the other relevant states.”34
The Court in Bankovic established Article 1 jurisdiction as
being primarily territorial, deviating from their previous case
law. In previous cases, the Court held that “jurisdiction was not
limited to the national territory of the High Contracting Parties.”35 The justices in Bankovic, to comply with the early precedent, held that there were exceptional circumstances under
which the Convention could apply beyond the territory of the
Contracting state.36 Therefore, the Court found that “Article 1
of the Convention must be considered to reflect this ordinary
and essentially territorial notion of jurisdiction, other bases of
jurisdiction being exceptional and requiring special justification in the particular circumstances of each case.”37
The creation of this category of exceptional cases redefined
much of the ECtHR’s prior precedent. Labeling cases such as
38
39
Cyprus v. Turkey (1975) and Loizidou v. Turkey (1995) as
Bankovic v. Belgium, ¶ 18.
Id. ¶ 19.
33 Id. ¶ 59.
34 Id. (emphasis added). The Court cited several authorities for this finding including The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law, and The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law, Twenty Years Later, by Thomas
Mann. Oppenheim notes that “territoriality is the primary basis for jurisdiction,” and Brownlie states that “jurisdiction is territorial.” Williams, supra
note 7, at 692. This role that this notion of territorial jurisdiction played in
the Court’s rationale in Bankovic was very contentious. Some scholars believed that the European Convention’s view on the term “within its jurisdiction”, should be based on its unique object and purpose as a Human Rights
Treaty. See NATO Bombing Case, supra note 14, at 70.
35 Williams, supra note 7, at 692.
36 Bankovic v. Belgium, ¶ 74.
37 Id. ¶ 61.
38 Cyprus v. Turkey, App. Nos. 6780/74, 6950/75, 2 Eur. Comm’n H.R.
Dec. & Rep. 72 (1975).
31
32
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exceptions to a general principle lead to the conclusion that
there was a bevy of case law under which extraterritorial jurisdiction was deemed inadmissible. As some scholars maintain in
their criticisms of the Bankovic decision, the Court’s findings
were mischaracterized and directly misleading, focusing only
on their apparent desire to establish that “the scope of the
Convention was territorial.”40 Ultimately, whether intentional
or not, the Bankovic interpretation of jurisdiction varied considerably from the Court’s past determinations and narrowed
the extraterritorial capacity of Article 1 going forward.
In defining cases of extraterritorial applicability as exceptional¸ the Bankovic case outlined several exceptions to the territorial jurisdiction principle. The first exception centers on the
exercise of state authority outside the state territory. The 1999
case Drozd & Janousek v. France & Spain best characterized
this exception.41 It held that French and Spanish judges working in Andorran Courts were imputable to their home nations
due to the level of influence they held outside of their territory.42 This exception reflects a modern legal interpretation of jurisdiction that arises when there is “a substantial and genuine
connection between the subject-matter of the jurisdiction . . .
and the territorial base.”43 While the Court did not ultimately
hold France and Spain accountable for their justices’ actions,
they did state that jurisdiction extended beyond their borders
44
in such circumstances.
Bankovic’s second exception to the rule of territorial jurisdiction is often labeled “effective control.”45 First introduced in
Loizidou v. Turkey¸ this exception stands for the proposition
that a Contracting Party’s culpability may “arise when, as a
consequence of military action . . . it exercises effective control
46
of an area outside its national territory.” This control element
39 Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser A.)
(1995) (Preliminary Objections).
40 NATO Bombing Case, supra note 14, at 87.
41 See Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain, 240 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) (1992).
42 Id.
43 Williams, supra note 7, at 697.
44 DIJK ET AL., supra note 10, at 10.
45 See e.g. Al-Skeini Ors, R (on the application of) v. Secretary of State for
Defence [2005] EWCA (Civ) 1609, [190]-[197], [2007] Q.B. 140 (Eng.) [hereinafter Al-Skeini et al. v. Secretary of State for Defence 1].
46 Loizidou v. Turkey, Preliminary Objections, ¶ 62.
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could be satisfied either by military forces, or by the setup of
official organs or facets of local administration. 47 The factors
must all be considered on a case-by-case basis.48 The Court in
Loizidou did not fully establish what constituted “effective control,” but held that it was satisfied by the presence of over
30,000 Turkish troops in Northern Cyprus.49
The Court in Bankovic did not expand on the definition of
“effective control,” but rather held that the NATO’s aerial bombardment did not “secure effective control over the territory.”50
The Court’s holding indicates a necessity for the presence of
ground forces in order to secure substantial control of the people and the territory.51 Bankovic’s holding, concerning the ability of airstrikes to constitute “effective control,” has been criticized as not taking into consideration the Convention’s “living”
and “breathing” nature.52 Additionally, since the Court did not
fully define this exceptional principle of “effective,” Bankovic
served only to narrow the scope of Loizidou, and created confusion moving forward.
The third exception to the doctrine of territorial jurisdiction involved the activities of consular agents acting abroad, or
on board vessels “registered in, or flying the flag of, that
state.”53 This exception, sometimes referred to as the “consent,”
or “acquiescence” exception, applies to agents acting in a state
with the state’s consent.54 The Bankovic Court held that under
such conditions, “customary international law and treaty provisions have recognized the extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction by the relevant State.”55
The ECtHR’s description of the exceptional cases under
Id.
Id. at ¶ 61.
49 Loizidou v. Turkey, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. 513, ¶ 56 (1996) (judgment on the
merits).
50 Bankovic v. Belgium, ¶ 75.
51 See id.
52 Williams, supra note 7, at 703. Williams discusses the main criticism
that several scholars have voiced considering the effective control of a nation
or people via airpower. She argues “great accuracy and impact achieved by
modern weapons without the need for ground troops makes reliance on the
difference between air attack and ground troops unrealistic.” Williams, supra
note 7, at 704.
53 Bankovic v. Belgium, ¶ 73.
54 Williams, supra note 7, at 707.
55 Bankovic v. Belgium, ¶ 73.
47
48
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which Article 1’s jurisdiction could be granted extraterritorially
was brief and vague. What the Court did make clear was the
“exceptional nature” of the cases, and the primarily territorial
nature of jurisdiction. Ultimately, the ECtHR decided that the
case before them did not fall under any exceptional category.
The NATO militaries did not fit under the first exception as
there was no exercise of “legal authority” in the FRY. The
Court contentiously held that NATO powers did not fit under
the second exception of “effective control” because of the aerial
nature of the military operation. The military powers were also
clearly not operating in the FRY with the consent or acquiescence of the FRY, and therefore, the Court held that this case
was not an exceptional circumstance for which the jurisdiction
of the European Convention could be invoked.56
Another important determination by the ECtHR in
Bankovic was in refining the scope of the extraterritorial applicability only to countries within the boundaries of the European continent.57 The Court classified the Convention as a
“constitutional instrument of European public order,”58 and
held that its role was to monitor engagements between the
Contracting Parties.59 Essentially, the Court did not believe
that the benefits of the Convention should apply to nonContracting States:
In short, the Convention is a multi-lateral treaty operating… in
an essentially regional context and notably in the legal space
(espace jurisdique) of the Contracting States… The Convention
was not designed to be applied throughout the world, even in the
60
respect of the conduct of Contracting States.

Ultimately, the FRY does not fall within this “espace jurisdique,” and though the justices recognized a desire to avoid a
vacuum or black hole of human rights, they held that this desire should only materialize in areas normally covered by the
Convention.61

Id. ¶ 71.
Id. ¶ 80.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
56
57
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II. AL-SKEINI ET AL. V. UNITED KINGDOM (2011)
On July 7, 2011 the European Court of Human Rights decided Al-Skeini et al. v. United Kingdom, the most recent opinion concerning the extraterritorial nature of jurisdiction within
Article 1 of the European Convention.62 The decade following
the Bankovic decision that preceded this case has arguably
been the most critical decade for human rights treaties since
the end of the Second World War. While members of the international community are currently fighting a “war on terror,”
and two ongoing conflicts in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the
question of extraterritorial jurisdiction is of particular importance. Fortunately, in issuing their judgment in Al-Skeini,
the ECtHR held that the ECHR did apply to the United Kingdom’s military forces in Iraq, furthering the custom that human rights treaties will not be hamstrung by strict interpretation or semantic-driven arguments.63
A.

The Facts

On March 20, 2003, following Iraq’s alleged disregard of
United Nations Security Council Resolution (1441), the United
States, United Kingdom, and several other countries, invaded
Iraq.64 “By April 5, 2003, the British had captured Basrah, and
the United States had gained control of Baghdad.”65 After “major combat operations” were deemed complete on May 1, 2003,
the British and Americans created the Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA) to “exercise powers of government temporarily.”66 Among the CPA’s self-appointed duties were to “provide
for the effective administration of Iraq during the period of
transitional administration,” and to “restore conditions of security and stability.”67 Accordingly, the CPA was divided into re62 Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. 589
(2011).
63 Id.
64 Id. ¶ 10. Resolution 1441 sought to afford Iraq a final opportunity to
comply with its disarmament obligations and submit itself to future inspections.
65 Id.
66 U.N. Security Council, Letter dated 8 May 2003 from the Permanent
Representatives of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
and the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2003/538 (May 8, 2003).
67 PAUL BREMER, COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY REGULATION NO. 1,
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gional areas—including CPA South, which was under the responsibility and control of the United Kingdom.68
The petitioners in Al-Skeini were relatives of six Iraqi citizens killed in southern Iraq, a territory under which the United Kingdom had temporary authority. The petitioners alleged
that their relatives fell into the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom, a Contracting State of the ECHR; along with a breach in
Article 2 of the Convention resulting from the lack of effective
investigation into the questionable deaths of their relatives.69
These six deaths occurred between May 8, 2003 and November
10, 2003, after major military operations were deemed completed and the CPA had been established.70
One applicant in Al-Skeini was the father of Ahmen Jabbar Kareem Ali, a 15-year-old boy who was killed in Iraq on
May 8, 2003.71 According to the applicant, upon hearing that
British soldiers had arrested some Iraqi youths, and after his
child had not returned home as expected, he went looking for
his son.72 The applicant was informed by another young Iraqi
that he and the missing boy had been “arrested by British soldiers the previous day, beaten up, and forced into the waters of
the Shatt Al-Arab.”73 The British police were notified, but having spent several days waiting and searching, the applicant
found his son’s body in the Shatt Al-Arab on May 10, 2003.74
The victim’s father brought the body immediately to the
British police, who told him to go to a hospital, which was not
equipped to conduct a post mortem inspection.75 After burying
his son, in accordance with Islamic practice, the applicant returned to the British police station to ask for an investigation,
but was informed that it “was not the business of ‘the British
76
police’ to deal with such matters.” In a trial process that the
applicant found “confusing,” “intimidating,” and “biased in faCPA/REG/16 MAY 2003/01 (May 16, 2003).
68 Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, ¶ 13.
69 Id. ¶ 3.
70 Id. ¶¶ 34-71.
71 Id. ¶ 55 (Ali’s father was referred to as the “fifth” applicant in the court
opinion.).
72 Id. ¶ 56.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. ¶ 57.
76 Id, ¶ 58.
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vor of the accused,” the defendants were acquitted as a result of
the applicant’s evidence being “inconsistent and unreliable.”77
Another applicant claimed his 23 year-old brother Hazim
Al-Skeini, was killed by British soldiers just before midnight on
August 4, 2003, in Basra.78 According to the applicant, various
members of his family were gathering at his house for a funeral
ceremony on the evening of his brother’s death.79 As he was
welcoming guests to his home, the applicant saw Al-Skeini
gunned down by British soldiers as he was walking towards the
house.80 The applicant contends that his brother was unarmed
and roughly ten meters away from the soldiers when he was
shot, and that he “had no idea why the soldiers opened fire.”81
According to the British, the patrol approached on foot and
82
heard gunfire from different points. They saw the applicant’s
brother on the dark street, believed him to be pointing a gun in
their direction, and opened fire on him.83 The sergeant of the
patrol gave no verbal warning before firing, but believed that
his life and those of the other soldiers in the patrol “were at
immediate risk.”84 The head Brigadier was satisfied that the
actions of the sergeant fell within the Rules of Engagement,
and did not order any further investigation. 85
The circumstances surrounding the other four deaths were
similar in nature to the aforementioned occurrences.86 They all
Id. ¶ 60.
Id. ¶ 34 (Al-Skeini’s brother was referred to as the “first” applicant.).
79 Id.
80 Id. ¶ 35.
81 Id.
82 Id. ¶ 36.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id. ¶ 37.
86 The “second” applicant was the widow of Muhammad Salim, who was
killed shortly after midnight on November 6, 2003. As part of a raid, British
soldiers broke down the door of a house. One of the soldiers came face-to facewith the second applicant’s husband in the hallway of the house and shot
him. There was “no time” to give a verbal warning. Company Commander felt
the incident fell within the Rules of Engagement and did not require any further investigation. Id. ¶¶ 39-42. The “third” applicant was the widower of
Hannan Mahaibas Sadde Shmailawi, who was killed on November 10, 2003,
while sitting for dinner with her family. The applicant, his wife, and family
were sitting around the dinner table when “there was a sudden burst of machine gun-fire.” His wife was struck by bullets in the head and ankles and
died at a hospital shortly after the attack. The British claimed that the applicant’s wife was shot during a fight between a British patrol and group of “un77
78
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contained questionable activities by British military personnel
and a lack of due process in investigating the deaths. However,
regardless of the substantive nature of the petitioners’ allegations regarding the deaths of their relatives, questions on the
merits become moot if the ECHR cannot be applied extraterritorially. Without issuing perspective on the merits of the individual cases,87 we can accept as true the assertion that there is
at least a genuine issue of alleged human rights violations involved. Accordingly, the query becomes whether the petitioners
fall “within the jurisdiction” of the United Kingdom in order to
let their pleas be heard.
B. The Holding
The British courts first heard Al-Skeini in March of 2004,
when the Divisional Court held that in line with Bankovic, jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Convention was territorial.88
known gunman.” Colonel came to the conclusion that the incident fell within
the Rules of Engagement and did not require any further investigation. Id.
¶¶ 43-46. The “fourth” applicant was the brother of Waleed Sayay Muzban,
who was shot and killed on the night of August 24, 2003. The victim was driving a minibus with curtains drawn over its windows. The bus was stopped by
a British patrol, and when the driver reacted “aggressively” to the British officers and sped off, British officers shot out the tires of the bus. The officers
then contend that the victim appeared to be reaching for a weapon and yelling to people in the back of the bus. The officers then fired five rounds into
the bus, killing the fourth applicant’s brother. There were no weapons found
or people in the back of the bus. The Brigadier concluded the officer’s actions
fell within the Rules of Engagement and needed no further investigation. Id.
¶¶ 47-51. The “sixth” applicant is the father of Baha Mousa, who was 26
when he died in the custody of the British Army, three days after an arrest by
soldiers on September 14, 2003. He was told his son had been killed in custody at the British military base in Basrah. When identifying the body, he
found his son’s “body and face were covered in blood and bruises; his nose
was broken and part of the skin of his face had been torn away.” One witness
stated that the Iraqi detainees were “hooded, forced to maintain stress position, denied food and water, and kicked and beaten.” While seven soldiers
were charged with criminal offenses in connection with Baha Mousa’s death,
the charges were dropped against four of them and two others were acquitted. Id. ¶¶ 63-68.
87 The specific details regarding the deaths of the six petitioners’ relatives vary on a case to case basis. Some are more egregious than others. In
some of the cases, the human rights violation might simply have been the
failure of the British military to conduct sufficient investigation, making the
injustice primarily procedural. In those cases, the actions of the British soldiers may have been reasonable. But this determination of fact must be accorded the proper process.
88 Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, ¶ 74.
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The Court of Appeals affirmed this view and further opined
that the “effective control” exception was not applicable because “the combination of terrorist activity, the volatile situation, and the ineffectiveness of Iraqi security forces meant that
the security situation remained on a knife-edge for much of the
tour.”89 The House of Lords again affirmed this case in 2007,
regarding Bankovic as “watershed authority,” and holding that
application of the effective control principle beyond the Council
of Europe would be “contrary to the inescapable logic of the
Court’s case law.”90
The European Court of Human Rights accepted the petitioners’ application in 2007, and decided to hear the case.91 It is
important to note that prior to the discussion of whether jurisdiction of the European Convention should be applied extraterritorially, the ECtHR introduced a number of relevant international legal materials demonstrating a liberal view of human
rights treaty interpretation in favor of supporting the object
and purpose of the treaties themselves.92 This type of international case law was notably absent from the Bankovic decision,
and foreshadowed the Court’s intent to interpret Article 1 in a
way to ensure the universal protection of human rights.
In particular, the Court cited the International Court of
Justice’s (ICJ) advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences of
the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestine Territory.93
In this case, the Court applied the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights extraterritorially, even though the
language in Article 2, paragraph 1 states that a subject must
be “within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction.”94 The
advisory opinion noted that the provisions of the Covenant apply extraterritorially “for all conduct by the State party’s authorities or agents in those territories that affect the enjoyment
89 Al-Skeini et al. v. Secretary of State for Defence 1, ¶ 122. The Court
held that the sixth applicant’s son fell under the exception of Bankovic by his
death occurring in a British military prison, operating in Iraq with the consent of the Iraqi authorities.
90 Al- Skeini et al. v. Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 26,
[127], [2008] A.C. 153.
91 Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, ¶ 1.
92 Id. ¶¶ 89-94.
93 Id. ¶ 90 (citing Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 179 (July
9, 2004) [hereinafter Israeli Wall Case].
94 Israeli Wall Case, ¶ 108.
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of rights enshrined in the Covenant and fall within the ambit of
State responsibility of Israel under the principles of public international law.”95 Though the ICJ was interpreting the
ICCPR, this opinion influenced the ECtHR, because it applied
the treaty extraterritorially and placed a heavy reliance on its
object and purpose.
Consistent with Bankovic, the Al- Skeini Court ruled that
a state’s jurisdiction is primarily territorial.96 Similarly, the
Court held that its case law has recognized a number of exceptional circumstances capable of warranting jurisdiction beyond
the borders of the Contracting State.97 The first exception created jurisdiction when the acts of diplomatic and consular
agents exert authority and control over others outside of the
territory of the State.98
The Al- Skeini Court recognized a second “consent” or “acquiescence” exception, arising when “in accordance with custom, treaty, or other agreement, authorities of the Contracting
State carry out executive or judicial functions on the territory
of another state.”99 Next, the Court held that the use of force by
a State’s agents operating outside its territory may bring the
individual brought under the State’s control into Article 1 jurisdiction.100 To illustrate this case, the ECtHR cited Ocalan v.
Turkey, where the Court held that after the petitioner was
handed over to Turkish officials, he was “effectively under
Turkish authority,” allowing him to qualify for Article 1 jurisdiction.101 The essential characteristic of this exception was
that the power and control is over the person in question.
The Court next discussed Bankovic’s “effective control” exception. While the Justices had further defined the previous
exceptions, they had stayed more or less true to the Bankovic
precedent. However, with “effective control,” the Court expanded on its narrow interpretation in Bankovic, and provided some
additional factors to consider when determining whether this
Id. ¶ 110.
Al- Skeini v. United Kingdom, ¶ 131.
97 Id. ¶ 132.
98 Id. ¶ 134.
99 Id. ¶ 135.
100 Id. ¶ 136.
101 Id. (citing Issa and Others v. Turkey, App. No. 55721/07 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(1996); Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 61498/08
(2010)).
95
96
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qualification was met.102 The Court stated that when determining whether the standard is met, “the Court will primarily have
reference to the strength of the State’s military presence in the
area.”103 The ECtHR also noted, however, that “other indicators” may be relevant, such as how much the State’s “military,
economic and political support” for the local administration
gives the occupying State control over the region.104 The “effective control” test appears to be much more inclusive in this case
than as portrayed in Bankovic.
Al- Skeini also disagreed with Bankovic’s notion of a Conventional legal space (“espace jurisdique”). While the Court
noted that the convention is an “instrument of European public
order,” and that the Convention applies solely within its “legal
space,” it also noted that the Convention does not imply that
Article 1 jurisdiction can never exist extraterritorially.105 The
Convention may dictate where jurisdiction applies, however,
that does not necessarily indicate that the absence of extraterritorial jurisdiction, outside of the Council of Europe, cannot
exist. Al- Skeini’s interpretation, while potentially creative,
harmonizes much more cleanly with the object and purpose of
the European Convention as a human rights treaty.
Applying the facts of the Al-Skeini cases, the Court found
that the situation in Iraq constituted “exceptional circumstances.”106 According to the ECtHR, the United Kingdom, through
its soldiers, engaged in “security operations,” and “exercised
authority and control over individuals killed in the course of
such security operations, so as to establish a jurisdictional link
between the deceased and the United Kingdom for purposes of
Article 1 of the Convention.”107 Therefore the Court in AlSkeini both invoked the third and fourth exception, where persons and areas came under the “effective control” of British
military.
Though the ECtHR’s decision in Al-Skeini is extremely recent, and has not yet been held to the scrutiny of peer review,
one criticism it has faced was from one of its concurring justicAl-Skeini v. United Kingdom, ¶ 138-39.
Id. ¶ 139.
104 Id.
105 Id. ¶ 141-42.
106 Id. ¶ 149.
107 Id.
102
103
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es. Justice Bonello argued that the Court did not go far enough
in establishing a bright line rule in protecting human rights interests.108 Bonello was unwilling to accept what he views to be
an “a la carte” respect for human rights,109 stating: “[a]ny state
that worships fundamental rights on its own territory but then
feels free to make a mockery of them anywhere else does not . .
. belong to the comity of nations for which the supremacy of
human rights is both mission and clarion call.”110 More succinctly, Justice Bonello believed the United Kingdom was arguing that the Convention was “ratified . . . with the deliberate
intent of regulating conduct of its armed forces according to latitude. Gentlemen at home, hoodlums elsewhere.”111
Regardless of Bonello’s concurrence, the ruling in Al-Skeini
is an encouraging sign for the extraterritorial applicability of
the ECHR. Not only did this case expand upon the notion of “effective control,” but it also eliminated the espace jurisdique argument, which, under Bankovic, prohibited the application of
the European Convention beyond Europe’s borders. Al-Skeini
speaks to the object and purpose of the Convention as a human
rights treaty needing to be enforced universally as such.
Court decisions like Al-Skeini et al. v. United Kingdom
have strengthened the notion of customary law that States are
bound by human rights treaties and obligations not only within
their territories, but beyond their borders and throughout the
world. Fortunately, there appears to be a growing tradition of
international courts liberally applying jurisdictional requirements in order to secure the object and purpose of these human
rights treaties. This encouraging sign indicates that these
courts are more focused on promoting human rights and eliminating legal vacuums and black holes where nations can perpetrate human rights violations without any accountability.
III. THE UNITED STATES AND THE “WAR ON TERROR”
In the decade after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the United
States has taken several steps backwards in international human rights law. Certainly, the United States has never been a
Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, (Bonello, G., concurring, ¶ 18).
Id.
110 Id.
111 Id.
108
109
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leading proponent of the international human rights regime,
often displaying a “s[k]eptical” and “stand-offish” attitude towards embracing human rights provisions.112 However, the aggressive counterterrorism strategies employed by the United
States in response to Al- Qaeda’s attacks on U.S. soil arouse serious human rights concerns.113 The failure of the United
States, the world’s only superpower, to uphold basic human
rights interests have endangered the legitimacy of the human
rights regime, and should be addressed by binding forums of
international law.
From allegations of torture, cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment, to the unlawful detention of prisoners without
their due process habeas corpus rights, the United States has
been at the center of human rights inquiry. As many of the
abuses have been perpetrated beyond the territory of the United States, the issue of whether human rights instruments apply extraterritorially is especially pertinent. Unfortunately, the
United States’ apparent willingness to disregard basic notions
of human rights throughout the world has created the human
rights vacuums and legal black holes that court decisions such
as Al-Skeini sought to avoid.
A.

The Facts

Though there are human rights issues present within the
territory of the United States, the most egregious of alleged
human rights abuses by United States authorities have occurred outside its borders. In the months after September 11,
2001, the United States began “Operation Enduring Freedom,”
in which it waged war on the Taliban and Al-Qeada in Afghanistan.114 During the Operation, thousands of Afghan civilians
were killed, and U.S. forces sent hundreds of prisoners to be
held in the Guantanamo Bay detention center.115 Furthermore,
during this time, it was alleged that the United States committed human rights atrocities during the “Dasht-i-Leili Massacre”

112 Joan Fitzpatrick, Speaking Law to Power: The War Against Terrorism
and Human Rights, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 241, 242 (2003).
113 Id.
114 Marjorie Cohn, Human Rights in the Wake of 9/11: Human Rights:
Casualty of the War on Terror, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 317, 319 (2003).
115 Id. at 319-21.
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in Afghanistan.116 The massacre refers to the deaths of hundreds (or possibly thousands) of Taliban prisoners during their
transportation from Kunduz to Sheberghan prison in Afghanistan by U.S. and Junbish-i Milli soldiers.117 According to the
2002 documentary, Afghan Massacre: The Convoy of Death”118,
prisoners in the transport “suffocated in closed containers that
lacked any ventilation,” while those that survived were
“dumped in the desert, shot and left to be eaten by dogs.”119
Based on witness accounts, the film claims that United States
military personnel participated in prisoner executions of some
who survived the transport.120
The United States has also been accused of engaging in inhumane treatment of their detainees abroad. Of the prisoners
kept in Guantanamo Bay, “many [were] blindfolded, thrown into walls, bound in painful positions, subjected to loud noises
and deprived of sleep.”121 The United Nations report condemning the treatment of prisoners in Guantanamo Bay included
“stress positions” for hours, and the use of the detainee’s fears,
namely dogs, as mechanisms used to intimidate and coerce information.122
Moreover, the United States government secretly sent
many terrorist suspects to be questioned in countries such as
Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco that have a reputation for utilizing
brutal means of interrogation. 123 Consequently, the United
States would not have to take responsibility for any alleged
human rights abuses occurring during questioning or detention.124 By outsourcing torture to other nations, while engaging
in interrogative strategies as severe as “waterboarding,”125 the
116

2002).

AFGHAN MASSACRE: THE CONVOY

OF

DEATH (Atlantic Celtic Films

Id.
Id.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Cohn, supra note 114, at 327.
122 Economic and Social Council, Situation of detainees at Guantánamo
Bay, Report of the Chairperson, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/120 (Feb. 15, 2006).
123 Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2002, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/06/09/AR2006060901356.html.
124 Id.
125 Dan Froomkin, Bush Glib Waterboarding Admission Sparks Outrage,
HUFFINGTON POST, June 3, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/06/03/
117
118

2013]

EXTRATERR’L APP. OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES

437

United States has clearly committed widespread atrocities beyond its borders.
While the crimes committed by United States forces across
the globe violated several human rights agreements, including
the Convention Against Torture (CAT), the United Nations
Charter, and the Third and Fourth Geneva Convention,126 this
analysis will focus on whether the abuses violate the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) due to its
territorial restriction on jurisdiction.
B. The Problem
While the ECtHR’s decision in Al-Skeini reflects a growing
international custom indicating a willingness to favor the object and purpose of human rights treaties over their “territorial” limitations, the United States has neglected to take part in
it. Unfortunately, the practices of the United States during the
recent human rights revolution reflects a willingness to sign
and ratify only the treaties that already comply with their own
domestic law. 127 When the provisions of a human rights treaty
do not comply with their already existing law, the United
States Congress has traditionally ratified it with provisions, objecting to the contents that may infringe on existing domestic
law.128 The practice of the United States in regards to its’ ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) is particularly illustrative.
The ICCPR opened for signature in 1966 and was entered
into force in 1976.129 The treaty was enacted by the Human
Rights Commission, which created it alongside the International Bill of Rights in furtherance of an effort to devise mechanisms for the “implementation and protection of fundamental

bushs-glib-waterboarding_n_599893.html.
126 Cohn, supra note 114, at 317. The United States has objected to the
assertion that any of these Agreements have been violated by US practice in
the “war on terror,” for many reasons which will not be discussed in this paper.
127 Kenneth Roth, The Charade of US Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties, 1 CHI. J. INT’L. L. 347 (2000).
128 Id. at 349.
129 Connor Colette, Recent Development: The United States’ Second and
Third Periodic Report to the United Nations Human Rights Committee, 49
HARV. INT’L L.J. 509, 511 (2008).
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human rights.”130 The United States signed the treaty on October 5, 1977, but did not ratify it until June 8, 1992.131 The ratification came with several reservations, and thus failed to give
full effect to the breadth of the ICCPR.132 While treaty reservations are permissible under Article 19 of the Vienna Convention, many of the United States’ reservations have been publically criticized as being contrary to the object and purpose of
the ICCPR.133
As it ratified the ICCPR in 1977, the United States declared that the provisions of the Covenant were non-self executing, thereby asserting that the Treaty’s Articles did not
amount to a legal obligation.134 Declaring a treaty’s provisions
as non-self executing does not strip it of its power in itself, but
once the Justice Department failed to implement the treaty via
its own domestic legislation, it became essentially nonbinding.135 Additionally, the United States retained the right to
execute its minors, and indicated that cruel, degrading, and inhumane treatment would only be interpreted in accordance
with the United States Constitution.136 In effect, this gave the
treaty little to no weight, making the ratification of the ICCPR
130 Id. The other Human Rights treaty that was created by the Human
Rights Commission was the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Though the ICCPR has run into several legitimacy problems, the ICESCR has dealt with even greater problems as the language in its provisions are generally seen to be more vague and non-selfexecuting. Id. at 5.
131 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 Dec. 1966,
999
U.N.T.S.
171,
available
at
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/
ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en#top
[hereinafter ICCPR Database]. As of 11/12/11, there are 167 parties to the
treaty.
132 Id.
133 While Article 19 of the Vienna Convention permits a state to attach
reservations when they sign, ratify, accept, or approve of a treaty, Article
19(c) does not allow reservations when the reservation is “incompatible with
the object and purpose of the treaty.” Vienna Convention, supra note 5, Art.
19(c). In response to the United States’ persistent objection to Article 6(5)
which prohibits capital punishment for minors, eleven European states filed
objections declaring the reservation to be invalid on the basis that it went directly against the aims and purposes of the ICCPR. Inter-American Commission of Human Rights ¶ 62.
134 ICCPR Database, supra note 131.
135 Roth, supra note 127, at 349. By stating the ICCPR is non-self executing, and failing to domesticate the terms within the Articles of the Covenant,
the United States effectively stripped the covenant of all its intended power.
136 ICCPR Database, supra note 131.
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a “purely cosmetic gesture.”137 As a result, the United States
can claim to be part of a major human rights system while doing nothing to give life to the rights it embodies.
Still, by far the biggest failure of the United States to fully
embrace the nature of the ICCPR lies in its assertion that the
treaty’s provisions do not apply extraterritorially. Similar to
the European Convention, the ICCPR contains an article limiting its jurisdictional applicability. Article 2(1) states that
"[e]ach State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and
subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present
Covenant, without distinction of any kind . . . "138 By limiting
the Covenant’s application to “within its territory and subject
to its jurisdiction,”139 the scope of its authority is potentially
diminished. The United States has claimed that based on the
plain and ordinary meaning of its text, “this Article establishes
that States Parties are required to ensure the rights in the
Covenant only to individuals who are both within the territory
of a State Party and subject to that State Party's sovereign authority.”140
Supporting their “plain and ordinary meaning” interpretation of Article 2(1), the United States brought in the travaux
preparatoire of Eleanor Roosevelt, who was the US representative for the Commission on Human Rights in 1950, when Article 2 was being drafted.141 Roosevelt’s travaux indicated that
the United States was concerned with being held accountable
for actions occurring within then occupied Germany, and therefore proposed the language within its territory and subject to
its jurisdiction.142 From this, the United States alleges that it
is clear that the treaty should not apply extraterritorially.
Ironically, the United States’ argument relies almost completely on the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, an

Roth, supra note 127, at 349.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2, Oct. 5,
1977, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (emphasis added).
139 Id.
140 REPLY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE
REPORT OF THE FIVE UNCHR SPECIAL RAPPORTEURS ON DETAINEES IN
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA, 45 I.L.M. 742 (2006) [hereinafter US Reply].
141 Id. at 27.
142 Id.
137
138
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agreement it has failed to ratify.143 The United States recognized that it never ratified the Convention, yet stated that it is
“often consulted as a guide to general principles of treaty interpretation.”144 This assertion appears to treat the Convention as
international custom, a source of authority not often invoked by
the United States when dealing with human rights treaties.
A closer look at international custom concerning the extraterritorial nature of human rights treaties, and more specifically, the ICCPR, shows that the “plain and ordinary meaning”
approach is not sufficient. The United States’ position disregards the fact that in the past half-century since the enactment
of the ICCPR, the world has witnessed a human rights revolution.145 Consistently with modern international custom, it
would not be “tenable for the US to continue to maintain that
its human rights obligations stay at home while its armed forces go abroad.”146
In 1980, the Human Rights Committee (HRC) held in a
case in Uruguay, that the Convention should not be interpreted
so as to apply to all individuals under its jurisdiction regardless
of whether they are under their territory.147 Dealing with a
case in which the plaintiff was abducted within Uruguay, and
subsequently taken outside its borders to be tortured, the
Committee stated that “it would be unconscionable to so interpret the responsibility under article 2 of the Covenant as to
permit a State party to perpetrate violations of the Covenant
on the territory of another State, which violations it could not
perpetrate on its own territory.”148 The HRC recognized that it
would be “unconscionable” to interpret Article 2(1) as requiring
both “within the territory” and “subject to its jurisdiction,”149
and adopted a much more teleological interpretation of the ArThe United States has often held that when it does not ratify a Treaty, it cannot be bound by its provisions. (Ex: Convention on the Rights of the
Child) It is interesting that they now invoke a treaty they have not ratified as
their method of interpreting the ICCPR.
144 US Reply, supra note 140, at 25.
145 THOMAS MCDONNELL, THE UNITED STATES, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND
THE STRUGGLE AGAINST TERRORISM 56 (2011).
146 Id.
147 Sergio Euben Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, Comm., No. R.12/52, U.N.
Doc. Supp. No. 40 A/36/40, at 176 (July 29, 1981), available at http://www1.
umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/session36/12-52.htm.
148 Id. ¶ 12.3.
149 Id.
143
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ticle.
In a 2004 advisory opinion of the International Court of
Justice (ICJ), concerning Israel’s building of a wall in occupied
Palestine, the ICJ held that while the ICCPR’s jurisdiction was
“primarily territorial,” there were circumstances under which it
could be exercised outside of the national territory.150 The
Court further held that, “considering the object and purpose of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, it
would seem natural that, even when such is the case, States
parties to the Covenant should be bound to comply with its
provisions.”151 Regarding the intent of the framers in drafting
the language of Article 2(1), the Court stated: “the drafters of
the Covenant did not intend to allow States to escape from
their obligations when they exercise jurisdiction outside their
national territory.”152
Both the 1980 HRC decision and the 2004 ICJ advisory
opinion represent the international custom that has developed
contrary to the United States’ stance on the ICCPR’s extraterritorial capacity. The United States, however, has continued to
claim that the treaty does not apply extraterritorially, failing to
mention actions it induced outside its borders in its periodic
reports to the Human Rights Committee.153 Though the HRC
has obtained information on the controversial situations in
Guantanamo Bay, Iraq, and Afghanistan through “shadow reports” submitted by nongovernmental organizations,154 the
Committee’s recommendations have had little effect on United
States foreign policy. The HRC lacked any substantial binding
authority before the First Optional Protocol, which gave the
Committee the power to issue “authoritative determinations.”155 The United States, however, has not ratified the Op150 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 179 (July 9).
151 Id.
152 Id. Regarding the framer’s Travaux, “They only intended to prevent
persons residing abroad from asserting, vis-à-vis their State of origin, rights
that do not fall within the competence of that State, but of that of the State of
residence.” Id. (citation omitted).
153 Colette, supra 129, at 515.
154 Id. at 512.
155 See Human Rights Comm., General Comment No 33: The Obligations
of States Parties Under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, ¶¶ 13-14, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/33 (Nov. 5,
2008).
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tional Protocol, and has never officially recognized the treaty as
binding law.156
While the United States is technically a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, its State practice has indicated a more ‘a la carte’ compliance with the rights
the treaty enshrines. This Nation’s disregard for the treaty led
one respected scholar to claim that “rarely has a treaty been so
abused.”157 Until the United States can take steps to truly
abide by the ICCPR, its ratification will continue to be purely
‘cosmetic,’ furthering the United States perspective that treaties should only be ratified to further “codify existing U.S. practice,” while doing nothing to compel the further protection of
human rights.158
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court’s decision in Al-Skeini et al. v. United Kingdom
was yet another example of a growing international custom indicating that human rights treaties should be applied extraterritorially. In light of the human rights revolution the world has
witnessed over the past half-century, this case stands as a positive reinforcement of an evolving conventional norm. Human
rights treaties should be applied consistent with their object
and purpose and not hamstrung by the confines of territorial
restriction. The Preamble of the European Convention stated a
goal to ensure the universal recognition of human rights.159 To
contradict this notion would be to defy the very purpose of the
treaty. The Court in Al-Skeini recognized this principle and issued a decision consistent with modern international law.
Sadly, the United States’ continued unwillingness to apply
the human rights regime throughout the world greatly weakens the progress of the entire international community in developing a strong international custom. Even more discouraging is the near purposeful nature of the United States’
disregard of international law. While the United Kingdom
raised Article 1 defenses in the Al-Skeini case, it has accepted
ICCPR Database, supra note 131.
JORDAN PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 375
(2d ed. 2003).
158 Roth, supra note 127, at 349-50.
159 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms preamble, Apr. 11, 1950, C.E.T.S. No. 194, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
156
157
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culpability for its actions in Iraq, and acknowledged the ECtHR’s decision. The United States, however, has not hid its
willingness to perpetrate human rights violations, leading one
CIA official to state that "[i]f you don't violate someone's human rights some of the time, you probably aren't doing your
job,” 160 and former Vice President Dick Cheney to state that
waterboarding was a “no-brainer.”161 This whimsical attitude
towards human rights violations is especially worrisome.
Unfortunately, the actions of the United States have diminished much of what the human rights regime can accomplish against other severe violators. As a violator itself, the
United States has lost its influence in advocating for human
rights interests elsewhere. In 2002, Amnesty International said
that the administration had “lost the moral authority to criticize human rights abuses abroad, because of its own denial of
human rights to foreigners detained since September 11.”162
Human Rights Watch agreed by stating that the message sent
by the United States is that of which “human rights are dispensable in the name of fighting terrorism.”163 The unfortunate
result has been a copy-cat approach where many already repressive governments have used the “war on terror” to justify
abusive military campaigns on their domestic political opponents.164 While by no means is the United States the biggest
human rights abuser, Human Rights Watch stated that “Washington has so much power today that when it flouts human
rights standards, it damages human rights causes worldwide.”165
In recent years, however, the United States has taken
steps that may indicate there has been a ‘turning of the tide’ in
its treatment of international human rights agreements. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recently stated “a commitment to
human rights starts with universal standards and with holding
everyone accountable to those standards, including ourPriest & Gellman, supra note 123.
Froomkin, supra note 125.
162 Cohn, supra note 114, at 364.
163 Joel Brinkley, Report Says U.S. Human Rights Abuses Have Eroded
Support for Efforts Against Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2003,
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/15/world/threats-responses-accusationsreport-says-us-human-rights-abuses-have-eroded.html.
164 Cohn, supra note 114, at 364 (citing Brinkley, supra note 163).
165 Brinkley, supra note 163.
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selves.”166 Clinton further claimed that human rights are
“rights that apply everywhere, to everyone.”167 Additionally,
President Barack Obama noted in an address to the United
Nations General Council Assembly in 2009, that “[t]he world
must stand together to demonstrate that international law is
not an empty promise, and that Treaties will be enforced.”168
While these statements mean nothing without corresponding
action, the current administration’s beliefs are much more
amenable to complying with norms of international law than
those of its predecessor.
The encouraging attitude of the Obama administration
may indicate that the United States has begun to hold itself accountable for its actions abroad. Recently, Harold Hongiy Koh,
Legal Advisor to the U.S. Department of State commented that
the relationship between the International Criminal Court
(ICC) had changed from “hostility to positive engagement.”169
The United States had previously held it would not join the
ICC.
Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has shown
a willingness to apply international law to its domestic practice
in its decisions in Roper v. Simmons,170 which abolished the juvenile death penalty, and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,171 which held
that military commissions established to try detainees at
Guantanamo Bay violate the Geneva Conventions. This State
practice demonstrates that, at the very least, the United States
is realizing the presence of international law within their judicial decisions.
Though the United States may be making progress to166 Jordan Paust, Ending the U.S. Program of Torture and Impunity:
President Obama's First Steps and the Path Forward, 19 TUL. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 151, 157 (2010).
167 Id.
168 Barack Obama, President of the United States, Address to the United
Nations General Assembly: Responsibility for Our Common Future (Sept. 23,
2009) (transcript available at http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements
/2009/september/129519.htm).
169 Harold Hongjy Koh, Legal Advisor to the United States Dep’t of State
& Stephen J. Rapp, Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, Special
Briefing on the U.S. Engagement with the International Criminal Court and
the Outcome of the Recently Concluded Review Conference (Jun. 15, 2010)
(transcript
available
at
http://geneva.usmission.gov/2010/06/15/u-sengagement-with-the-icc/).
170 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
171 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
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wards respecting treaties such as the ICCPR, it must understand the significance of its global footprint as it relates to international custom in the human rights regime. The Al-Skeini
decision declares that the human rights regime applies universally, but the United States has yet to affirm that decision by
applying the ICCPR to their state practice. The interests of
human rights are bigger than “American Exceptionalism,” and
the United States should begin to take them seriously. Until
this occurs, the human rights vacuums and legal black holes
will continue to exist across the world, and the interests of
those harmed will suffer.

